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I. INTRODUCTION
The American economy is based upon the principles of com-
petition advanced by Adam Smith in An Inquiry into the Nature
and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Throughout the years, the
American economy has gone through different periods of devel-
opment. Today, "competitiveness" has become the buzzword among
the nation's industry, labor and legislative leaders' as they have rec-
1. Governors Call for Activism, The Christian Sci. Monitor 13 (July 29, 1987) (Governors
call for greater cooperation between federal and state governments, and between industry and labor
to improve U.S. competitiveness); House Rules Committee Urged to Require Review of U.S. Budget
Impact on Trade, DAILY REP. FOR ExacuTrvs L-3, Apr. 10, 1987, (Rep. Donald Pease, (D- Ohio)
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ognized American industries' inability to compete in an increasing
number of world trade markets.2 Although the remarkable reversal
in the United States' trade picture,3 going from a net creditor of
$140 billion in 1981 to the biggest debtor owing $265 billion by the
end of 1986, has created a sense of outrage and a desire to take
some corrective action, leaders have not reached a consensus on the
appropriate path to follow.
The discussion is complicated by economic and political concerns
over the controversies of free trade4 and protectionist policies,5 the
implications of international treaties, 6 and the issues regarding the
appropriate role of government in creating7 and implementing an
effective solution. 8 This Note attempts to navigate around these
2. Southern Governors Conference Focuses on Textile Imports During Basic Industry Sessions,
DAiLY REP. FOR EX EcutvEs L-1 1, Aug. 13, 1986, (discusses textile industry's inability to compete in
world markets because of the advantages enjoyed by developing countries).
3. Stamp, U.S. Must Slow Its Soaring Foreign Debt, Central Banker Says, RENTER'S Bus.
REP. Aug. 27, 1987.
4. See Weidenbaum, The Case for Free Trade, 3A PuB. L.F. 79; Gold, Protectionism and
Steel: The Need to Replace Outworn Perspectives, 14 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 447; Gephardt,
Protecting America's Trade Without Protectionism, 11 FLETCHER F. 201; Friedman, Free Markets
and Free Speech, 10 HARv. J.L. & PU. POL'Y 1; Albert, Free Trade: Problematic Theory and Anach.
ronistic Faith, 8 L. & PoL'Y 213.
5. See Anderton, Protectionism is Problematic in Theory and Practice: A Comment on Albert,
9 L. & POL'Y 233; Brilbeck, The Growing Shadow of Trade Protectionism, 10 J. LEGIs. 382; Quayle,
United States International Competitiveness and Trade Policies for the 1980's, 5 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 1; Leach, Protectionism: Good Fences Don't Make Good Neighbors, 19 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. &
POL. 973; Ray, Changing Patterns of Protectionism: The Fall in Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff
Barriers, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 285.
6. See Franck, Taking Treaties Seriously, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 67; Chaney, International Agree-
ments and the Development of Customary International Law, 61 WAsH. L. REv. 971: Paust, Re-
discovering the Relationship Between Congressional Power and International Law: Exceptions to the
Last in Time Rule and the Primacy of Custom, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 392.
7. See Shenefield, Competitiveness in the Global Economy - The Need for an End to Ideology,
53 AtNmusT L.J. 53; Rosenthal, Industrial Policy and Competitiveness: The Emergence of the Escape
Clause, 18 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 749; Barrett, Problems with State Aid to New or Expanding
Businesses, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1019, Miller, Industrial Policy: Reindustrialization Through Com-
petition or Coordinated Action, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 1; Sullivan, U.S. Policy in a Mixed World Econ-
omy, 15 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 309; Marcum, Energy in the 1980's: Government and Industry
Responsibilities, 110 PUB. UTr. FORT. 13; McBride, American Industry vs. Foreign Governments,
1983 Bus. & Soc'Y REv. 67 (Fall 1983).
8. See Goldstein, The Impact of Ideas on Trade Policy: The Origins of U.S. Agricultural and
Manufacturing Policies, 43 INT'L ORG. 31; Scheiber, State Law and 'Industrial Policy' in American
Development, 1790-1987, 75 CAL. L. REv. 415; Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The
Protection of Economic Interests, 1889-1910, 52 U. Cm. L. R-v. 324; Glazer, The Expanded Use
of Space Act Authority to Accelerate Space Commercialization Through Advanced Joint Enterprises
between Federal and Non-Federal Constituencies, 12 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 339.
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problems in the context of one industry long associated with the
United States' leadership in the world economy-the coal industry.
Part II of this Note sets forth the facts regarding Colombia's
entrance into the world coal market and describes the particular
advantages which enable Colombia's coal industry to undercut the
American industry both at home and abroad. Colombia's lower pro-
duction, transportation, regulatory and tax costs make Colombian
coal about $8 per ton cheaper than U.S. coal. Part III examines
the impact of Columbia's entrance upon the United States coal in-
dustry, from both a domestic and a global viewpoint. While rec-
ognizing the potential for sizable increases in Colombian imports,
this Note stresses the importance of a global perspective.
In 1985 Colombia began a policy of price competitiveness in the
world coal market by making substantial deliveries to utilities in the
coastal United States. Companies who had provided coal to these
users felt the impact of these imports. However, all U.S. producers
are affected by the introduction of a new supply source, specifically
because it reduces the market price of coal in the United States.
Colombia's emergence as a world coal producer has had a sig-
nificant impact on U.S. exporters of coal. Colombia's entrance into
the market, together with that of Venezuela and China, has con-
tributed to a supply glut in the world coal market. This situation
has caused coal prices to fall and made it much more difficult for
the relatively high cost U.S. producers to compete. Because Col-
ombia has caused problems for U.S. producers in both domestic
and foreign markets, it is necessary to take a global view in creating
a solution to the problem.
Part IV of this Note discusses various proposals to counter the
threat of Colombian coal, specifically, and the problem of U.S. non-
competitiveness, generally. These proposals include the use of tariffs,
the reliance on the free market system, and the use of tax incentives
as a method of encouraging technological developments to improve
an industry's competitiveness. Part IV continues with an assessment
of the various proposals and concludes with a proposal for the path
most likely to lead to the re-emergence of the United States as a
competitive force in the world economy.
1990] 1013
3
Sarahan: A Response to Colombian Coal Imports: The Path to New Competitive
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
This Note argues for a program of tax incentives for industrial
cooperative research partnerships to encourage increases in U.S. in-
dustrial productivity. This increase in productivity would lower the
cost of domestic goods sold at home and would make U.S. industries
more competitive in the world markets. Together with initiatives in
educational, fiscal and monetary policies, this program can move
the United States in the direction of new competitiveness.
II. TiE EM RGENCE OF COLo MIA As A MAJOR COAL EXPORTER
In 1985, coal industry leaders and congressional representatives 9
realized the United States, a country with 291 billion short 0 tons
of recoverable coal reserves," was projected to import increasing
quantities of foreign steam 12 coal. 3 Most of this coal was expected
to come from a newcomer to the world coal market, Colombia. 4
One Senator compared the situation to the improbable example of
Saudi Arabia importing oil.'5
Colombia's emergence as a major player in the coal market began
in 1976 when it accepted competitive bids for participation in the
joint development of high quality steam coal in the La Guajira Pen-
insula in northeast Colombia. 6 As a result of this bidding process,
9. Impact of Coal Imports on the Domestic Coal Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Natural Resources Development and Production of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural
Resources [hereinafter Impact] 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); Importation and Marketing of Coal From
Other Nations Into the United States: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Mining and Natural Re-
sources of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs [hereinafter Importation], 99th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1985).
10. A short ton equals 2,000 pounds.
11. ENERGY INFO. ADmN., ANNUAL PROSPECTS FOR WORLD COAL TRADE 1988 23 (1988).
12. Coal is classified by use into two categories, steam and metallurgical coal. Steam coal is
used by utilities to create electricity, while metallurgical coal is used in the production of alloys, such
as steel.
13. DEP'T Coi&., POTENTIAL FOR U.S. STEAM COAL IMPoRTS (1985) (Estimates imports of 17.7
million tons by 1990, up from 1.3 million tons in 1984); ENERGY INFO. ADWN., OUTLOOK FOR U.S.
COAL ImpORTs (1986) (Imports estimated to reach 4.8 million tons by 1985. The study discounts the
Department of Commerce's assumption that importers would capitalize on markets along the Mis-
sissippi River).
14. ENERGY IrNFo. ADm'N., OUTLooK FOR U.S. COAL ImPORTs (1986) (Under estimates of 4.8
million tons, Colombia projected to account for sixty percent of this amount. Under other assump-
tions, imports could reach 7.7 million tons with Colombia accounting for seventy-five percent of this
total).
15. Impact, supra note 9, at 14 (statement of Senator Robert Byrd (D-W. Va.)).
16. Id. at 143 (statement of Richard C. Kiddoo, president, Exxon Coal International).
1014 [Vol. 92
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Exxon's subsidiary, Intercor, became a 50-50 partner in the El Cer-
rejon Project with Carbocol, a coal company formed and owned
by the Colombian government. 17 The development costs were pro-
jected at $3.3 billion.
18
The El Cerrejon Project presented many lucrative physical ad-
vantages to Exxon which form the core of the problem as viewed
by the U.S. coal industry. The first advantageous characteristic of
El Cerrejon is the size of the reserves located in this section of
Colombia. The reserves of the first stage of the development project
are estimated at 3 billion metric19 tons. 20 Compared to American
operations, this level is equivalent to the demonstrated reserves of
Virginia.21 Also, secondary development has started again at El Cer-
rejon Central, which has a potential production of one million metric
tons per year. 22 These quantities of reserves were necessary to attract
the large investment required for development and were a key el-
ement in creating interest in the bidding process.2 3
The second beneficial characteristic of the El Cerrejon Project
was the proximity of large quantities of coal to the surface. Within
650 feet of El Cerrejon North's surface lies 2 billion metric tons of
coal reserves. 24 This proximity provides the partnership with easy
retrieval and, therefore, a relatively low cost of production. 2
17. Id.
18. Domestic Coal Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Natural Resources Development
and Production of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, [hereinafter Domestic Coal
Industry] 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1986) (statement of Michael T. Kelley, deputy assistant secretary,
Basic Industries, International Trade Administration. The Export-Import Bank of the United States
has loaned $850 million to Carbocol for the purchase of U.S. services and mining equipment for El
Cerrejon).
19. A metric ton is equal to 2,204.6 pounds.
20. Burger, Cerrejon: Coal from Columbia, ENGINEERING & M4NNG J. 32 J (Apr. 1985).
21. ENERGY INto. ADmN., CoA. PRODUCTION 1986 150 (1988). (This amount is .6% of U.S.
Demonstrated Reserve Base).
22. The Outlook for Colombian Coal Continues Bright, CoAL AGE 32 (Dec. 1986).
23. Bidding to Exploit Low-Sulfur Coal, Bus. WEEK, INT'L ED. 38 (Feb. 16, 1976) (Companies
from the United States, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Poland, Romania and Brazil were among
those who made bids to participate in the development project).
24. INT'L TRADE COMNSSION, THE POSITION AND COmPETITrvENESS OF THE UNITED STATES IN
WORLD COAL TRADE 89 n.3 (1985).
25. Impact, supra note 9, at 173. (statement of Forrest E. Hill, president, Hill & Associates,
Inc. Colombia can produce coal at $25 a ton).
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The third attractive factor in the development of the partnership
between Columbia and Exxon was the quality of coal available. The
El Cerrejon coal has a low-sulfur, 6 high British thermal unit27 (Btu)
content. 28 The low-sulfur content makes the coal very attractive to
utility purchasers who must meet stringent environmental standards
in the U.S. 29 and in Europe. 0 By containing low quantities of sulfur,
the coal meets these environmental requirements with less need for
expensive pollution-preventing techniques thus, reducing costs to the
utility companies and to their customers. The high-Btu content al-
lows utilities to purchase lower quantities of coal yet attain the same
level of production of electricity.31 Because of this difference in qual-
ity, it may be more economical in the long run to purchase the
higher-Btu coal even if the price of that coal is higher than the lower-
quality coal. Having these two physical attributes, the El Cerrejon
coal is, of course, very competitive in the major coal markets of
the world.
The final advantage enjoyed by Exxon and Carbocol is that of
a location which provides ease of transportation. El Cerrejon is lo-
cated on the tip of the La Guajira Peninsula which juts out into
the Caribbean Sea. Although the construction of a seaport was nec-
26. Sulfur content determines the amount of treatment necessary to meet pollution regulations
in the United States. Low-sulfur coal requires less treatment and therefore reduces the purchaser's
expenses.
27. A British thermal unit (Btu) is a measure of heating capacity. One Btu is the amount of
heat necessary to raise the temperature of a pound of pure water one degree Fahrenheit.
28. Importation, supra note 9, at 52 (statement of Richard C. Kiddoo, president, Exxon Coal
International).
29. Naftal, States News Service (Sep. 13, 1988) (discussion of acid rain problem resulting from
Florida electric companies' use of coal in context of Congressional efforts to strengthen the Clean
Air Act); President George Bush, March, 9, 1989 (Committed to protecting the environment while
assuring that our energy requirements are fully met, Bush wants continued development of clean coal
technology).
30. Winds of Change Are Energizing European Industry, L.A. Times, June 23, 1988, at 17,
col. 4 (Environmental concerns regarding coal are making Europeans consider windmills as an al-
ternative energy source); Hibbs, RWE's Rates Mount as Nuclear Ambitions are Fettered by Coal
Lobby, NucLEoNscs VEEK 8 (Aug. 15, 1985) (Europe's largest privately owned utility raised rates
due to new environmental regulations on coal-fired power plants).
31. Domestic Coal Industry, supra note 18, at 45. (statement of Lawrence A. Pettis, deputy
administrator, Energy Information Administration. 4.8 million tons of Colombian coal imports would
displace 5 million tons of domestic coal).
[Vol. 921016
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essary,3 2 the resulting low transportation costs33 have allowed the
partnership to penetrate markets in Western Europe,3 4 the United
States35 and Japan.
3 6
Taken in combination, these four characteristics of El Cerrejon
provide Colombia with the potential to attain high levels of pro-
duction and profits through its coal mining operations. Colombia
has tapped this potential with production levels at El Cerrejon North
reaching 11.5 million metric tons in 1986. 37 These levels are projected
to hit 13.6 million metric tons by 1990.38 Operations have proved
so successful that development has begun again at El Cerrejon
CentraP9 with production levels estimated at 1 million metric tons
by 1990. 40
III. EL CERREJON PROJECT'S IMPACT ON THE U.S. CoAL
INDUSTRY
Though the U.S. coal industry's production of steam coal has
increased dramatically since 1973,'41 the industry's ability to compete
32. Burger, supra note 20, at 32J. Intercor is responsible for the construction and operation
of the mine, the railroad, the port, and all of the support facilities. The cost of the construction,
however, is to be split evenly between Intercor and Carbocol.
33. Importation, supra note 9, at 53 (statement of Richard C. Kiddoo, president, Exxon Coal
International. Colombian transportation costs to Florida or Boston total $6 and $8, respectively, while
shipments from Kentucky to Florida or Boston cost $18 to $20).
34. PR Newswire, June 6, 1980 (Exxon announces sale of 30.3 million tons of Colombian coal
to Danish Consortium); A Gritty Future for U.S. Coal Exporters, 54 Bus. WEEK, (Feb. 27, 1984)
(sales to Spain and Ireland); ENGmEEiNG & MnNGro J., 160 (Sept. 1988) (monthly report of exports
to Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom).
35. A Gritty Future, supra note 34, at 54. (Carbocol lines up annual contract with Puerto
Rico); ENonqmEaaNG & M, mG J. 16C (Sept. 1988) (report of Colombian exports for July 1988 to
the United States - 202,000 metric tons); Domestic Coal Industry, supra note 18. (statement of Tracy
Danese, vice president, Governmental Affairs, Florida Power & Light Company. Florida Power and
Light Company purchases 800,000 tons of Colombian coal).
36. ENGINEERNcG & MW'WG J., 161 (Apr. 1987) (carbocol enters into three spot contracts with
Japan, agrees with Japanese Ministry of Trade and Industry to ship 800,000 metric tons in 1987 and
proposed a sale of 49%o of its interest in El Cerrejon North).
37. Mastino, The Mineral Industry of Colombia 266 MIN. Y.B. (1986).
38. Coal Worldwide, CoAL 37 (Nov. 1988).
39. El Cerrejon Central operated from 1982 to 1984 before it shut down due to continual losses.
The mine was reopened in 1988.
40. Coal Worldwide, supra note 38.
41. Impact, supra note 9, at 14-15. (statement of Richard C. Kiddoo, president, Exxon Coal
International. Production increased from 460 million tons in 1973 to 800 million tons in 1984. The
Department of Energy predicts an increase of forty percent by 1994).
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in the world market has plummeted from 1981 to 1986.42 Although
many factors affect an industry's ability to compete in world trade,
including: dollar exchange rates;43 cost of capital;44 taxes and sub-
sidies; 45 and transportation rates, 46 a major factor in the changing
position of the U.S. coal industry has been the emergence of
Colombia47 and other countries48 as new coal suppliers. In the proc-
ess, Colombia has achieved a competitive edge over U.S. producers
both domestically and internationally.4 9 Experts first recognized ° this
edge in the context of domestic operations5' but, it has potentially
greater consequences in export operations.5 2
A. The Effect of Colombian Imports on the U.S. Coal
Industry's Domestic Operations
The United States purchased marginal levels of foreign coal from
1973 to 1984. 53 Although spot shortages caused these initial pur-
42. ENERGY INFo. ADMIN., ANNUAL PROSPzCTS FOR WoRD COAL TRADE 1988, at 2 (1988) (The
United States coal industry's share of the world coal trade has decreased from 36.9% in 1981 to
24.2% in 1986); ENERGY INFo. ADum;., ANNUAL OUTLooic FOR U.S. COAL 1988, at 34 (1988) (U.S.
coal industry's share of world steam coal trade has decreased from 29.3% in 1982 to 14.3% in 1987).
43. See Silk, Administration Split on Dollars, N.Y. Times, April 29, 1987, at 2, § D (advisers
differ as to whether the dollar should be allowed to fall to increase exports or whether the dollar
should be stabilized to calm exchange markets and the bond and stock markets); Ahearn, Baker Says
He is Not Trying to Prevent Dollar's Fall in Foreign Exchange Markets, THE BOND BUYER 28 (Feb.
2, 1987) (Baker says he will let exchange markets determine the dollar's level. A lower dollar would
make exports to the United States relatively more expensive and U.S. exports relatively cheaper).
44. See Haas, Slippery Slope, NAT'L J. 383 (Mar. 11, 1989) (Capital gains tax cut is intended
to make the United States more competitive with nations that do not tax such gains); Marotta, Revised
Tax Law Needed to Put American Capital to Work in the Economy, L.A. Times, February 12, 1989,
at 3, col. 3 (The United States is disadvantaged in international competition because of the high cost
of capital due to a capital-gains tax rate which is the highest among our major competitors).
45. See Szole, A World of Trading Places, L.A. Times, December 11, 1988, at 1, col. 3 (Eur-
opean farmers cannot compete in unsubsidized production).
46. See supra note 33.
47. ENERGY INFo. ADMIn., ANNUAL PROSPECTS FOR WORLD COAL TRADE 1988, at 4 (1988)
(Colombia's exports reached 9.5 million short tons of steam coal in 1987).
48. Id. (China expanded its steam imports with the opening of its Antaibao mine and Venezuela
entered the market with shipments to Europe and major commitments for deliveries in 1988).
49. See infra note 59.
50. Impact, supra note 9. Importation, supra note 9.
51. See infra note 59.
52. See supra at 17.
53. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL PROSPECTS FOR WORLD CoAL TRADE 1988, at 59 (1988)
(Imports ranged from a low of 0.1 million metric tons in 1973 to a high of 2.7 million metric tons
in 1978. The high level of purchases in 1978 was a distortion of the twelve-year trend and was caused
by the threat of a labor strike).
8
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 92, Iss. 4 [1990], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss4/8
NEW COMPETITIVENESS
chases,54 price competitiveness became a motivating factor in the
importation of 0.5 million metric tons of Colombian steam coal by
coastal utility purchasers in 1985. 55 Colombian producers enjoyed
advantages in labor 5 6 transportation 5 7 and regulatory costs. 58 Be-
cause of these advantages, imported coal was $8-$10/ton cheaper
than domestic coal.59 However, this price differential existed only
in the coastal portions of the United States and therefore total im-
ports by the United States accounted for only two-tenths of one
percent of U.S. consumption in 1987. 60
The future growth of Colombia's presence in the U.S. coal market
is a matter of great dispute. The projected impact depends almost
entirely on the assumption made with regard to Colombia's ability to
reach Mississippi River-based purchasers. 61 This assumption increases
the level of Colombian steam coal imports from 0.7 million metric
tons62 in 1986 to a potential of 6.9 million metric tons for 1990.63
54. Impact, supra note 9, at 134. (statement of Denny A. Ellerman, executive vice president,
National Coal Association. Imports were purchased in response to actual or anticipated labor disputes).
55. ENERGY INFO. ADmIN., ANNUAL PROSPECTS FOR \VORLD COAL TRADE 1988, at 64 (1988).
56. Domestic Coal Industry, supra note 18, at 16. (statement of Michael T. Kelley, deputy
assistant secretary, Basic Industries, International Trade Administration. Total labor cost per ton of
coal produced in Colombia is 35 percent lower than in the United States).
57. See supra note 33.
58. Domestic Coal Industry, supra note 18, at 16-17. (statement of Michael T. Kelley, deputy
assistant secretary, Basic Industries, International Trade Administration. No property, severance, black
lung, or reclamation taxes exist in Colombia while safety, health and environmental costs are "es-
sentially zero").
59. Impact, supra note 9, at 173, 181, 189 (statement of Forrest E. Hill, president, Hill &
Associates, Inc. Estimates that coal could be placed at the port in Colombia for $25/ton and trans-
ported to Virginia for another $6/ton. At the time, prices at Hampton Roads, Virginia were running
at the mid to high $30's level. Exxon would require $55/ton to achieve a 15% return on investment
at El Cerrejon. Kiddoo, president of Exxon Coal International confirmed Hills' estimates).
60. ENERGY INFO. ADmI., ANNUAL OUTLOOK FOR FOR U.S. COAL 1988, at 5 (1988) (U.S. utility
consumption for 1987 totaled 718 million short tons).
61. Impact, supra note 9, at 172, 180 (statement of Forrest E. Hill, president, Hill & Associates,
Inc. Hill's study found that foreign coal could compete with U.S. prices of 23 of the 34 utility plants
along the gulf coast, and at 27 of the 57 utility plants in the Atlantic Region. Hill's study found an
additional 76 plants in the Midwest which would be likely candidates for foreign purchases through
the use of the Mississippi River for transportation. By traveling up the Mississippi, the Missouri and
the Ohio Rivers become accessible); Domestic Coal Industry, supra note 18, at 199 (statement of
James Van Lanen, president, Coastal Coal Co. of Roanoke, Va. These plants represent 57 million
tons per year of uncontracted coal demand).
62. ENERGY INFO. ADmIN., ANNUAL PROSPECTS FOR VORLD COAL TRADE 1988, at 67 (1988).
63. Importation, supra note 9 (statement of Forrest E. Hill, president, Hill & Associates, Inc.
1990] 1019
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However, these projections have been criticized 64 as grossly ex-
aggerated because they are based on the assumption of cheap 65 and
easy access 66 to Mississippi River transportation. Instead, argue the
detractors, access for Colombian coal imports will be limited in the
future, as they are today,67 to the coastal areas of the United States. 68
Therefore, the level of Colombian imports would reach only 3 mil-
lion metric tons by 1990.69
Regardless which set of projections is followed, the question re-
mains whether these numbers represent a threat. to the domestic op-
erations of the U.S. coal industry. 70 Even at the highest projected
levels, Colombian imports would make up only one percent of U.S.
production for 1990.71 When viewed in the context of other United
This projection was for the maximum likely import demand from each of the five countries. The
sum of the estimated levels of each of the five countries was greater than the maximum likely import
demand for the entire United States. The maximum likely import demand for the United States was
estimated by Hill to reach 7.9 million metric tons by 1990. Hill projected that the U.S.'s maximum
likely import demand for 1985 would be 3.1 million metric tons while the actual level of imports
reached only 1.8 million metric tons).
64. Impact, supra note 9, at 189 (statement of Richard C. Kiddoo, president, Exxon Coal
International. Questions logic that barge owners carrying coal down the Mississippi would give Col-
ombian producers a relatively cheap method of hauling coal up the Mississippi. However, the logic
is not flawed unless one assumes that barge owners have an interest in preventing the entrance of
foreign coal into the U.S. It would appear that barge owners would prefer to haul some product up
the Mississippi in return for compensation rather than returning up the river "empty- handed").
65. Imporation, supra note 9 (statement of Forrest E. Hill, president, Hill & Associates, Inc.
Estimates coal can move upstream from New Orleans to Chicago for $6 per ton).
66. Id. (Most barges return up the river empty and therefore barge operators offer very low
backhaul rates to commodities traveling upstream).
67. Domestic Coal Industry, supra note 18, at 123 (statement of Tracy Danese, vice president,
Governmental Affairs, Florida Power & Light Company. St. Johns River Power Park Project in
Florida entered into a contract with Intercor to purchase 800,000 tons of coal a year); Importation,
supra note 9, at 126 (statement of Tyndall L. Baucom, vice president of procurement, Virginia Power.
Virginia Power test burned 30,000 tons of Colombian coal and found that future use of this coal is
possible).
68. Impact, supra note 9, at 191 (statement of Richard C. Kiddoo, president, Exxon Coal
International. Colombian imports limited to New England, Florida and the gulf coast of Texas).
69. Id. at 143 (Kiddoo cites high cost of transportation to most U.S. utilities and the higher
prices available in European markets as factors inhibiting any large presence in the U.S. market by
Colombia).
70. Domestic Coal Industry, supra note 18, at 45 (statement of Lawrence A. Pettis, deputy
administrator, Energy Information Administration. Projections regarding displacement of domestic
production, jobs and sales reflect the foregoing of further growth rather than losses from the current
level in each of these areas. Figures in each of these areas will increase but will not meet the levels
previously projected).
71. Impact, supra note 9, at 143 (statement of Richard C. Kiddoo, president, Exxon Coal
International).
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States industries' attempts to compete against a flood of foreign
imports, the problems of the U.S. domestic coal industry are not
likely to be ranked high on any priority list.72 However, to avoid
the path followed by the steel industry,73 it is necessary to make
informed decisions now as to the future of the domestic coal industry
and as to the economic and technological coal policies which will
lead the industry to that future.
The impact of purchases of Colombian coal by utilities is not
limited to the particular U.S. supplier that has been directly dis-
placed by these imports. The introduction of a new source of coal
increases supply and, therefore, will tend to decrease the market
price of coal. 74 This lower market price affects all suppliers in the
market because, at best, it reduces the margin of profit attainable
on each sale. The reduction in price could also cause a profitable
operation to become unprofitable. At some point, the operation will
be unable to meet its variable costs75 and, assuming the operator
acts in the most economically efficient manner, he will shut down
the operation. 76 Considering the start-up costs involved in reopening
a coal mine, it may be impossible for the mine to ever be operational
again. Industry and legislative leaders must consider this hidden cost
in analyzing the impact of Colombia's penetration into the U.S. coal
market.
72. Senate Votes Curbs on Textile, Apparel Imports, L.A. Times, (Sept. 9, 1988) at 2, at col.
1 (textile companies are thriving because of imports' restraints); Farnsworth, Diaper Import Quotas
Under Fire, N.Y. Times, May 31, 1988, at 1, § D (Reagan Administration says curbs are necessary
because domestic industry is being killed by imports); Trantman, Antidumping Move May Slow Import
of Cheap Foreign Foods, RENTER'S Bus. REP. Aug. 14, 1987 (steel industry has been hit hard by
imports and the United States has a voluntary agreement with the major foreign steelmakers to limit
exports until the U.S. industry modernizes); Taylor, States News Services, (Feb. 27, 1987) (Inter-
national Trade Commission finds domestic flower industry materially injured, levies anti-dumping
duties on imports); Hicks, Foreign Rivals Worry Paper Companies, N.Y. Times, November 10, 1986,
at 5, § D (Growing numbers of new foreign producers developing the ability to compete in the United
States).
73. See Gold, Protectionism and Steel: The Need to Replace Outworn Perspectives, 14 CASE
W. Res. J. INT'L L. 447.
74. P. SAMUELssoN, EcoNomics 530 (lth ed. 1980).
75. Id. at 431 (Variable costs are the sum of all costs that vary with output. Examples of these
costs include cost of materials and wages for production line workers).
76. Id. at 432 (At some point, it is more expensive to produce than to actually shut down the
operation. This point occurs when production does not earn enough revenues to cover variable costs).
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B. The Effect of Colombian Production on the U.S. Coal
Industry's Foreign Sales
Although reports of increasing imports into the coastal regions
of the United States77 inspired much of the congressional activity of
198578 and 1986,'7 Colombia's entrance 80 into foreign markets greatly
affected 81 U.S. coal producers. Though the United States' share of
the total world coal trade fell from 33.1% in 1980 to 21.2% in
1987,82 its share of the world steam coal trade took a much sharper
drop. 83 The reason behind these extreme variations in U.S. export
activity involves two interrelated market factors.
The first factor leading to the decrease in the United States' share
of the world coal trade is our industry's position as solely a "swing"
producer. 84 Because of the United States' enormous coal reserves,"
foreign purchasers can rely on the U.S. coal industry to provide coal
in times of spot shortages.8 6 However, in recent years U.S. producers
have not been price-competitive in foreign markets87 and, therefore,
77. See supra notes 9, 55.
78. See Impact, supra note 50.
79. See Domestic Coal Industry, supra note 18; Importation, supra note 9.
80. Id. at 2 (Colombia's coal exports began in 1980 at a level of 0.1 million short tons and
has grown to a level of 5.4 million short tons in 1986).
81. ENERGY INrFo. ADmiN., ANruAL PROSPECTS FOR WORLD COAL TIUDE 1988, at 3 (1988)
(Because of Colombia's emergence as a major new supplier, U.S. coal exports in 1986 fell for the
first time since 1983 and declined significantly in 1987, while Colombia exported at record levels).
82. ENERGY INFO. AnmN., ANNuAL OuTooic FOR U.S. CoAL 1988, at 33, 34 (1988) (The United
States exported 91.7 million tons in 1980 while world trade for that year totaled 277.2 million tons.
In 1987, U.S. exports accounted for 79.6 million tons out of a total world trade of 375.4 million
tons).
83. Id. at 13, 34 (The United States' share of world steam coal trade fell from 29.3% in 1982
[41.7 million tons exported out of world trade totaling 142.1 million tons] to 14.3% in 1987 [22.9
million tons exported out of total world trade of 194.6 million tons]. This trend is projected to continue
with the United States' share of world steam coal trade falling to 11.8% by 2000 with U.S. exports
accounting for only 34 million short tons of exports in a world market of 321 million short tons of
exports).
84. ENERGY INFO. ADuaN., ANNuAL PROSPECTS FOR WORLD COAL TRADE 1988, at 1 (1988) (A
"swing" supplier is able to support increased export demand as well as greater domestic needs).
85. See supra note 11.
86. ENERGY INFo. ADmiN., ANNUAL PROSPECTS FOR WORLD COAL TRADE 1988, at 1 (1988)
(Examples include the United States' increased exports in 1980 and 1981 to cover for Poland's reduced
level of exports, a ten-week miners strike in Australia, and South Africa's inability to expand its
export capacity).
87. See supra note 59.
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have been limited to playing this role of "swing" producer without
much room for expansion in the current market.88
The second factor explaining the decreasing role of U.S. prod-
ucers in the world coal market is the supply glut8 9 which has existed
over the last seven years. 90 The addition of supply sources in Co-
lumbia, Venezuela and China91 has contributed great quantities of
coal to the world market.92 In times of increasing supply, the price
of a good decreases. 93 Given the U.S. producers' position as a rel-
atively high-cost producer,94 the increasing supply and its downward
effect on the price of coal has made it even harder to compete in
the world market. 95
When these two factors are taken in combination, they have even
more of an impact. Given the supply glut which currently exists,
spot shortages are rare. Therefore, even the United States' role as
a "swing" producer has been minimized. 6 Currently, it is projected
that the supply glut will not disappear until 1995 at the
earliest. 97 However, the coal industry must make critical decisions
now on how to compete in the changing world market.
88. See supra note 83.
89. ENERGY Iro. ADmN., ANqmAL PROSPECTS FOR WORLD COAL TRADE 1988 23 (1988) (A
supply glut results from a world-wide export production capacity which is greater than the world-
wide demand for these exports. Prior to 1982, countries expanded their production capacity in an-
ticipation of a large increase in demand for coal. The world economic recession in 1982 decreased
demand for coal and other forms of energy. Although the economic recovery of 1984 has eliminated
some of the surplus, the excess supply is expected to exist for many years).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 26, 27, 29 (Although Colombia began exporting coal from El Cerrejon North in
1985, Venezuela and China first exported coal in major quantities in 1987. Venezuela has recoverable
reserves estimated at 8 billion tons and much of its exporting, like Colombia, will be directed at
Western Europe. China's reserves, totaling 109 billion tons, will be aimed at Pacific Rim purchasers).
92. Id. at 32 (Although Colombia and China exported 13 million short tons of steam- coal in
1985, projections call for the three countries to account for 57 million short tons of exports in 1995
and 75 million short tons by 2000).
93. See supra note 74.
94. ENERGY INFO. ADmiN., ANNUAL OUTLOOK FOR U.S. COAL 1988 37 (1988) (World coal prices
have fallen to levels at which some U.S. producers cannot compete, though the average price of U.S.
export coal has decreased between 21 and 30 percent from 1983 to 1987).
95. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL PROSPECTS FOR WORLD COAL TRADE 1988 30 (1988) (The
United States was the world's largest exporter of coal until 1984 when it was surpassed by Australia.
Australian exports exceeded those of the United States by 16.5 million tons in 1986).
96. ENERGY INFO. ADMiN., ANNUAL OUTLOOK FOR U.S. COAL 1988 37 (1988) (U.S. steam coal
exports to Western Europe, the largest market for this product, fell by 5 million tons in 1987).
97. Domestic Coal Industry, supra note 18, at 179 (statement of Lawrence A. Pettis, deputy
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Although it is tempting to view the domestic and foreign coal
markets as isolated and distinct spheres of competition, it is nec-
essary to view the situation from a global perspective. To a greater
extent than ever before, world trade has become interconnected and
interdependent.9 8 World markets are quickly approaching a situation
best described by the law of physics which states every action creates
an equal but opposite reaction.9 This environment has been rec-
ognized in the world coal markets. 1°° When market activity in the
domestic or international coal markets is considered, it must be re-
membered that with every one ton of foreign coal sold in the United
States, one less ton of coal is available to our foreign purchasers,
and vice versa.' 0 The policy best designed to revive the ailing U.S.
coal industry will only come about by approaching the current sit-
uation from a global perspective.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS To IMPROVE HEALTH OF
UNITED STATES COAL PRODUCERS
As a part of the United States congressional hearings held in
1985 and 1986, legislators suggested a number of solutions to the
problems of the U.S. coal industry.0 2 Although much of the debate
centered on the advantages and disadvantages of free trade and pro-
administrator, Energy Information Administration. The EIA Coal Supply and Transportation Model
assumes there will be no surplus coal production capacity in the world markets in 1995 because demand
is expected to rise in Europe and in Asia and because low spot market prices should discourage further
large-scale development).
98. See Clouds Over Trade, L.A. Times 4, col. 2 (Dec. 5, 1988) (Advice of Barber B. Conable,
president of the World Bank, to world-trade negotiators before the Uruguay Rounds on GATT).
99. Newton's Third Law of Motion.
100. Impact, supra note 9, at 129 (statement of Denny A. Ellerman, executive vice president,
National Coal Association. Effect of tariff would be to force Colombia to seek other markets for
their coal. Because U.S. producers also serve these markets, the effect would be the loss of export
opportunities for these producers).
101. Domestic Coal Industry, supra note 18, at 65, 66 (statement of Robert M. Schnapp, chief
of data analysis and forecasting branch, Energy Information Administration).
102. In 1985, legislators introduced HR 1905 and S 2356. Entitled the Coal Trade Equalization
Act, these identical bills sought to impose an $8 tariff on all coal imported into the country. After
failing to attain approval in 1985, the bill was introduced again in 1986 as S 1092. Again, the bill
did not get past the committee. The bill has been introduced in the current session but the odds do
not appear to favor passage. A second proposal, introduced in 1985 as S 946 and in 1986 as S 1185,
would deny a company importing coal into the United States the opportunity to attain new coal leases
put forward by the federal government. It too has failed to gather the support to get out of committee.
1024 [Vol. 92
14
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 92, Iss. 4 [1990], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss4/8
NEW COMPETITIVENESS
tectionist policies, neither theory provides a solution to the total
problem. Though this Note focuses on the U.S. coal industry, the
analysis of the following three proposals can, in many aspects, apply
to the U.S. industrial system as a whole.
A. Tariffs/Protectionist Policies
Because of the differential between the delivered price of Col-
ombian coal and that of U.S. coal, 103 one of the first proposals to
emerge from the congressional hearings was a tariff of $8/ton leveled
at imports of Colombian coal.' 4 The justifications for this policy
center around two aspects of Intercor's and Carbocol's El Cerrejon
development. These are the project's relatively low cost of produc-
tion and the partnership's marketing scheme, under which it is selling
coal at extremely low rates of return on investment. 105
The first justification, the project's relatively low cost of pro-
duction, 06 is based on a number of economic advantages enjoyed
by Intercor and Carbocol. The first of these factors is the extremely
low cost of labor'0° even when the project's lower level of produc-
tivity is considered. 08 Secondly, Columbia lacks reclamation, 09 and
black lung"0 taxes which are imposed on U.S. producers."' Finally,
environmental and safety regulations are negligible if not nonexist-
103. See supra note 59.
104. See supra note 102.
105. Cerrejon, supra note 20, at 24A. (Selling prices required to cover costs at Cerrejon North
are estimated at $34-$52/metric ton f.o.b. for Carbocol and $43-$73/metric ton for Intercor); Lee,
Coal: Supply Tightens, ENGINEERNG & MnQN J. 52 (March 1989) (Spot price of Colombian steam
coal increased from $30/metric ton f.o.b. in 1987 to $35/metric ton by the end of 1988).
106. See supra note 59.
107. Domestic Coal Industry, supra note 18, at 34 (statement of Dr. Hermann Enzer, assistant
director, Mineral Data Analysis, Bureau of Mines, Department of Interior. El Cerrejon's labor costs
totaled $5.90 compared to those of a West Virginia surface mine's $18.89).
108. Id. (Adjusted for productivity, El Cerrejon's costs decreased to $3.07 while the West Virginia
mine's only fell to $9.66).
109. Reclamation is the process which restores land to its original state after production is com-
pleted. The taxes go to pay for this process when mines are abandoned.
110. These taxes benefit coal miners who develop pneumoconiosis, a chronic dust disease of the
lung.
111. Domestic Coal Industry, supra note 18, at 29 (statement of Dr. Hermann Enzer, assistant
director, Mineral Data Analysis, Bureau of Mines, Department of Interior. The imposition of these
taxes would add $0.93 per ton (2%) to the average total cost of El Cerrejon).
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ent. 12 As an example of this final advantage, Colombia does not
require that companies strip-mining coal return the surface to its
original state after the mine is no longer productive." 3 In combi-
nation, these three factors give Intercor and Carbocol a cost-ad-
vantage against which U.S. producers have difficulty competing."t 4
In addition to other factors, principally transportation,'15 this cost-
advantage has allowed Colombia to penetrate U.S. domestic coal
markets."16 Some U.S. producers and labor leaders, therefore, believe
that a tariff is necessary "to even the playing field"117 and to enable
U.S. producers to compete successfully.
A second justification for the imposition of tariffs is Carbocol
and Intercor's marketing scheme. By selling at just over the cost of
production and delivery,"8  Colombian producers can undercut the
competition. This predatory pricing 19 enables Colombia to enter new
markets and to force other producers out. 20 Once this is accom-
plished, say proponents of this argument, Colombia can raise its
prices and recoup its earlier losses.' 2' Although this scenario is pos-
sible, at least theoretically, it is not very realistic in the U.S. coal
industry given its large reserves 22 and its long-time presence as a
leading exporter in world coal trade. 23
112. Id. at 27, 33 (Colombia's mine safety, health and environmental standards have not yet
been developed. However, Intercor and Carbocol claim to be operating voluntarily under U.S. health,
safety and environmental standards. The costs of these standards is $1.29 at West Virginia surface
mines and $0.87 at El Cerrejon North).
113. Importation, supra note 9, at 36, 62 (statement of Richard C. Kiddoo, president, Exxon
Coal Internation. Describes Colombian environmental regulations as "skimpy" but explains backfilling
plan being carried out by Intercor and Carbocol).
114. See supra note 59.
115. Principally transportation, see supra note 33.
116. See supra note 67.
117. Impact, supra note 9, at 233 (statement of Richard L. Trumka, president, United Mine
Workers of America).
118. See supra notes 59, 105.
119. Predatory pricing or dumping occurs when a producer sells goods abroad at less than the
market price at home.
120. See supra note 105. There is a question whether Colombia's activity would be considered
dumping.
121. See International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
122. See supra note 11.
123. ENERGY INFO. ADMN., ANNUAL PROSPECTS FOR WORLD COAL TRADE 1988 30, 32 (1988)
(Australia became the world's largest exporter of coal in 1984 and 1986 exceeded United States totals
by 16.5 million tons. EIA projects that the United States will be in fourth place by 2000).
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A third possible justification is the argument that the U.S. coal
industry needs protection from imports in order to restructure itself
into a more efficient and productive industry. Although this reasoning
may justify the imposition of tariffs, 124 the current proposals in this
area have not included the requirement that the industry take action
to make itself more competitive.'25
Although proponents contend the existence of a cost-advantage by
a foreign competitor in a market as important as coal justifies the
imposition of tariffs, many disadvantages exist which make the use
of tariffs ineffective and even harmful. Due to the basic operation of
a tariff, this tool attempts to protect only the domestic sales of U.S.
producers and has no beneficial effect on sales by U.S. producers in
foreign markets.' Actually, its harmful effect in these markets can
be enormous. If a tariff is effective, 127 the foreign good, in this case
Colombian coal, is locked out of the U.S. market because its price
has become higher than that of U.S. coal. A commodity such as coal,
when prohibited entry into one market, generally seeks another outlet. 128
In the case of steam coal, the likely market is Western Europe, 29
where U.S. producers rank among the largest suppliers. 130 Therefore,
by preventing Colombia from competing in U.S. markets, the use of
tariffs can cause competition to stiffen for U.S. producers in foreign
markets where they currently have a foothold.
The imposition of tariffs causes a second negative impact on U.S.
exports by provoking acts of retaliation by foreign countries.' For
124. But see, P. SAMUsELSON, EcoNo~ncs 656, 657 (11th ed. 1980) (This argument runs counter
to comparative advantage theory. Industries which no longer have a comparative advantage should
be eliminated and resources should be reallocated to other industries).
125. See supra note 102, specifically the Coal Trade Equalization Act.
126. P. SAMUzLSON, supra note 124, at 651 (A prohibitive tariff raises the price of imported
goods to at least the level of domestic goods).
127. Id. at 634 (To completely halt imports, the tariff must be equal to or greater than the cost
differential between the domestic good and the foreign import).
128. Impact, supra note 9, at 129 (statement of Denny A. Ellerman, executive vice president,
National Coal Association).
129. ENERGY INFo. An.Dmw., ANUAL PROSPECTs FOR WORLD COAL TRADE 1988 67 (1988) (Western
Europe is the largest importing area and accounted for 48.5% of world steam coal imports in 1986).
130. Id. (In 1986, the United States exported 18.3 million metric tons of steam coal to Western
Europe, which imported a total of 85.2 million metric tons).
131. See Norman, Canada May Face U.S. Levies, Limits Due to Fish Ban, Wall St. J., March
29, 1989, at 5, col. 2 (Canadian retaliation expected after U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills
invoked trade provisions which could result in higher tariffs on Canadian goods).
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example, in response to a tariff on coal imported into the United
States, Colombia may institute tariffs on U.S. agricultural prod-
ucts. 1 2 Therefore, the use of tariffs has hidden effects, both within
and outside the particular industry being "protected." Before in-
stituting this Scheme, congressional and industrial leaders should
consider these hidden costs when evaluating the costs and benefits
of any policy which includes the use of tariffs.
Legislators must also consider the domestic effects of tariffs. An
obvious effect of the policy of imposing tariffs, in most cases, is
to increase the cost of the good to the consumers.' Under the laws
of comparative advantage, the most efficient trade policy for each
country is to export those goods for which they have a comparative
advantage and to import products for which they are at a com-
parative disadvantage. 3 4 From this process, consumers are able to
purchase the highest quality products at the lowest possible price. 3
By instituting a tariff, the government raises the price of the im-
ported good to a level above that which the free market would
determine. 3 6 The consumer, therefore, is prevented from attaining
the highest quality good at the lowest and most efficient price.
A second domestic problem arising from the use of tariffs is
that, through implementation of this policy, the government is in
effect rewarding inefficiency. 1 The Administration sends a message
to U.S. industry that they should come to the government for as-
sistance rather than work to develop a plan to regain a competitive
edge. Also, the use of tariffs provides an additional type of incentive
to the industry receiving the protection. As seen with regard to the
132. DEP'T AGuc., CoLoa aiA: AN EXPORT MARKET PROFImE 20, 21 (1987) (The United States
accounted for 75% of Colombia's agricultural imports in 1985. Leading products included wheat,
barley, tallow, sorghum, and dry peas).
133. P. SAMUELSON, supra note 124, at 634. (When a tariff completely shuts out imports, the
consumers pay more for the product, but the government raises no revenue).
134. Id. For a complete discussion of the theory of comparative advantage. The theory states
that whether or not one of two countries is absolutely more efficient in the production of every good
than the other country, if each specializes in the products in which it has the greatest relative efficiency,
trade will be mutually profitable to both countries. Real incomes will also rise in both countries).
135. Id. at 630.
136. Id. at 634 n.9 (The price increase will usually not be as large as the tariff).
137. Id. at 651.
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steel industry, "protected" industries have a tendency to return to
Congress in an attempt to procure additional protection.'38 This in-
centive will persist until Congress and the Administration bind the
imposition of a tariff to an industry commitment to make the changes
necessary to become competitive again. Although this approach would
temper the effects of the second problem area, other domestic con-
cerns, global market and political implications would continue to
disfavor the use of tariffs as a tool to achieve new competitiveness.
The final domestic problem resulting from the use of tariffs is
best exemplified in the sales of Colombian coal to Puerto Rican 139
purchasers. 140 The problem occurs when an imposed tariff is insuf-
ficient to match the cost differential between the U.S. and the for-
eign good. 14' Thus, the tariff levies a tax on the consumer 142 without
accomplishing the intended aims of the tariff. No new purchases of
U.S. coal will result, and, depending on the elasticity of demand
for coal, 43 purchases of Colombian coal may decrease only slightly.
Because of the difficulty of estimating the appropriate level at which
to set a tariff,' 44 a great danger of this occurrence exists.
138. See Pine, Wall Street J., September 6, 1984, at 8, col. 1 (Reagan rejects steel industry plea
to replace tariffs with more stringent quotas); Lachica and Boyle, Wall Street J., July 12, 1984, at
3, col. I (U.S. International Trade Commission recommends quotas and additional tariffs for ailing
steel industry); Pine, Wall Street J., November 23, 1982, at 32 (U.S. steel industry significantly affects
US-EEC trade agreement on steel imports to U.S.). See also, Gold, Protectionism and Steel: The
Need to Replace Outworn Perspectives, 14 CAse W. Ras. J. INT'L L. 447
139. Puerto Rico is a commonwealth of the United States and, therefore, tariffs and other trade
measures apply to Puerto Rican purchases of foreign goods.
140. Importation, supra note 9, at 69 (statement of Carlos L. Suarez, chairman and president,
Puerto Rican Cement Co. Puerto Rico is totally dependent on external sources of fuels and purchases
all of its coal from Colombia. If an $8 tariff was imposed on Colombian coal, that coal would still
be cheaper than U.S. coal and purchases of Colombian coal would not decrease. Instead the price
of coal will increase and will make competition with foreign imports more difficult for the domestic
cement industry).
141. See supra note 59.
142. See supra note 133.
143. P. SA ruzsoN, supra note 124, at 358. (The elasticity of demand measures the degree of
responsiveness of the quantity demanded to changes in the market price. As demand becomes more
inelastic, the demand curve becomes more vertical. This type of demand curve would indicate that
An increase in price, caused for example by a tariff, would decrease the quantity demanded only
slightly relative to a more horizontal demand curve).
144. Given the fluctuations in the market price of coal caused by factors including labor problems
and oil and gas price fluctuations, it is very difficult to determine for any extended period of time
the level necessary to completely halt Colombian coal imports.
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The three domestic problems discussed above illustrate that a
policy of tariffs is economically inefficient and ineffective, even in
the domestic markets in which the policy is expected to have its
greatest positive effect. 45 Therefore, even the domestic advantages
of tariffs have associated costs which legislators should weigh heavily
in the decision-making process.
The imposition of tariffs also has an adverse effect on the ability
of the United States to conduct foreign policy in the area of trade.
If the United States erects new barriers, 146 including either tariffs
or non-tariff barriers such as quotas, to foreign trade, it will become
difficult to push the European Economic Community147 (EEC) or
Japan to lower the barriers erected against U.S. producers. 48 Upon
hearing of new quotas placed on sugar imports in 1982, one EEC
official said, "Americans really live in a glass house and they really
should not throw stones at us.' 1 49 To be effective in our promotion
of free international trade, our policies must reflect our jargon. Our
use of tariffs as a solution to our international trade problem could
set off a counterproductive string of retaliatory tariffs.
The final argument against the use of tariffs is the fact that
Colombian steam coal imports account for only .2% of U.S. con-
sumption. 150 Protectionist policies are generally proposed as neces-
sary to allow new industries the time needed to develop into an
operation which can stand on its own.' 5' Another basis asserted for
these policies is with regard to the case of an aging industry which
145. See supra note 126.
146. The new barriers could include either tariffs or non-tariff barriers such as quotas.
147. The European Economic Community, also known as the European Common Market was
founded by Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany and now includes
much of Europe.
148. Quayle, United States International Competitiveness and Trade Policies for the 1980's, 5
Nw. J. INT'L & Bus. 1, 19 (citing RENTER'S WIR SERVcE REPoRTs, (Apr. 26, 1982)) (U.S. Trade
Representative William Brock states that the imposition of sugar import quotas makes more difficult
the negotiations over other countries agricultural restrictions on U.S. imports).
149. Id. (citing RENTm's WaME SERvcE REPORTS, (May 14, 1982)).
150. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
151. See P. S.-tinrsoN, supra note 124, at 659 (Alexander Hamilton raised this argument in
"Report on Manufacturers." The theory argues that if the infant industry is confronted with foreign
competition in its early development it will fail but if given some room the industry can develop
economies of mass production and will be able to compete. Samuelson argues that while this pattern
is sometimes followed, the more common outcome is to create a perpetual infant).
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needs the time provided by this protection to retool or redevelop
their means of production. 152 However, the U.S. coal industry is not
a new industry and it is questionable whether a foreign presence in
.2% of the market is a sufficient threat to the safety of the industry
to justify protectionist measures at this time. However, proponents
would argue the United States cannot wait until the U.S. coal in-
dustry is at death's door before the government takes action. 153 Al-
though that statement may be a sound one, it is a call for some
action, in general, and not necessarily for protectionist policies.
The solution for our current trade problems is not to build larger
walls around our domestic markets but to develop more effective
and efficient weapons of production with which to wage a highly
competitive battle in a changing world economy. A growing con-
sensus over the last forty-five years has realized that the answer to
U.S. industry's problems lies not in economic isolationism which
offers only limited benefits while carrying extensive and complex
costs but, instead, in the encouragement of revitalization.154 How-
ever, the question remains as to which path the United States and
its industries should take to reach the goal of new competitiveness.
B. Reliance on the Free Trade System
The free trade theory has dominated United States trade policy
for the last fifty yearsY.55 For much of that period, the United States'
reliance on free trade and its advocacy of this policy on a worldwide
basis came without significant associated costs. 156 During the post-
World War II era, the industries of the United States enjoyed great
advantages in productivity over its foreign competitors and, there-
152. See supra note 124.
153. Id. (Samuelson recognizes there are arguments such as national defense concerns which
would justify tariffs. However, Samuelson distinguishes these arguments from the "peril point" ar-
gument described in the text accompanying note 152).
154. Id. at 660 (Graph displays average United States tariff rates since 1820. The rates ranged
from around 60% in 1930 after the Smoot-Hawley Act to under 10% after the Tokyo Round in
1980).
155. Borrnus and Goldstein, United States Trade Protectionism: Institutions, Norms, and Prac-
tices, 8 Nw. J. Ir'L L. & Bus. 328, 329.
156. Id. (Bonus and Goldstein compare the United States' ability to be committed to free trade
to Muhammad Ali's request for only a fair fight).
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fore, dominated foreign markets. 15 7 Thus, it was to the advantage
of the United States and its industries to favor a market theory which
emphasized the importance of open markets as well as the
disadvantages 158 which arise when barriers to free trade are insti-
tuted.
Over the last fifteen years, however, industries have found im-
ports can now compete effectively in many areas traditionally dom-
inated by U.S. producers. 15 9 Much of this competition has come
from Japan, which has virtually taken over control of the U.S. elec-
tronics market. 16° Suddenly, U.S. producers are ,',ewing the free trade
system from a different perspective and have begun to voice in-
creasing doubts about the wisdom of continuing with this trade pol-
icy.' 6' These doubts have again stirred the debate over which trade
policy, free trade or protectionism, is preferred. Although this ar-
gument has continued for decades, there has been little change in
the terms of the debate.
Advocates of a free trade policy base their arguments on the
comparative advantage theory, which states that, assuming goods
move freely across national borders, it is most efficient for a nation
to produce and sell those goods in which it has a comparative ad-
vantage and purchase from other countries those products in which
157. Id. (However, Borrus and Goldstein admit that the United States' support of free trade
was based on more than just economic self-interest. Other factors included United States security and
political stability in Europe and Japan).
158. See supra notes 126-54 and the accompanying text.
159. Borrus & Goldstein, supra note 155, at 329-30. (These areas include the automobile, steel,
textile and semiconductor industries).
160. See Senator Bentsen Calls F5X Plan "Bad Deal" for U.S.; Witnesses at House Hearing
Differ, DArLY REP. FOR ExEacuvTs, (Apr. 7, 1989) (Question whether avionics and aircraft industries
will be added to list of industry sectors "hollowed" by Japanese companies); Trantman, U.S. Threat-
ens Tough Action Against Asia, ECfor 'Unfair' Trade, REUTER LIBR. REP., Apr. 2, 1989 (Secretary
of Commerce Mosbacher asserts the United States must not lose high-definition television market to
Japan as it did with VCR's).
161. See Wartzman, Steel Import Curbs: The Debate Goes On, Wall Street J., February 6, 1989,
at 1, col. 5 (bills will be introduced in the House and Senate to extend protection of U.S. steel
industry); Japanese Companies Answer U.S. Charges on Machine Imports, Wall Street J., April 5,
1988, at 33, col. I (Japanese plastics industry disputes U.S. companies need for government pro-
tection); Waldman, Import Tax is More Important Politically than Economically, U.S. Executives
Say, Wall Street J., April 20, 1987, at 3, col. I (U.S. industry executives approve of President Reagan's
stiff tariffs on Japanese electronics).
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it is at a comparative disadvantage. 62 Adam Smith explained, "It
is the maxim of every prudent master of a family, never to attempt
to make at home what it will cost him more to make than to buy.
The tailor does not attempt to make his own shoes, but buys them
from the shoemaker. What is of prudence in the conduct of every
private family, can scarcely be folly in that of a great kingdom."'1
63
Through the operation of this theory, resources are allocated to their
most efficient use and the market can satisfy consumer demand at
the lowest possible cost.' 4 The use of free trade policy, therefore,
"promotes a mutually profitable regional division of labor, greatly
enhances the potential real national product of all nations, and makes
possible higher standards of living all over the globe.' ' 6
Those opposed to a reliance on the free trade system, either in
general or in terms of a specific industry, rely on a two- tiered
argument. The first argument attacks the assumptions underlying
the theory of comparative advantage. 66 The basis of free trade policy
is that international trade operates differently from domestic trade, 67
because international trade is determined on the basis of the com-
parative advantage theory rather than on the absolute advantage
68
theory. 69 Under this comparative advantage theory, for example,
the low-priced goods of Country A do not undercut the high-priced
goods of Country B.170 The comparative advantage theorists reach
this conclusion through the use of two key assumptions. The theory
162. See supra note 134.
163. Smith, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 424 (E.
Cannan ed. 1937) (5th ed. 1789).
164. Gifford, Redefining the Antitrust Labor Exemption, 72 MIN. L. Rnv. 1379 (1988).
165. Note, Economically Meaningful Markets: An Alternative Approach to Defining "Like Prod-
uct" and "Domestic Industry" Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 73 VA. L. REv. 1459, 1461
(1987) (quoting P. SAMUELSON, supra note 124, at 651).
166. Culbertson, A Realist View of International Trade and National Trade Policy, 18 INT'L L.
& PoL'Y 1119.
167. D. RiCARUo, PRINciPLES OF PoLrricAL EcoNomy AND TAXATION 83 (1947).
168. Absolute advantage occurs when one country can produce every good more efficiently than
the other country.
169. Culbertson, supra note 166, at 1127. But see P. SAMErsSON, supra note 134, at 627 (as
long as there are differences in the relative efficiencies of producing the different goods in the two
countries, the "poor" country will still have a comparative advantage in those goods in which it is
relatively more efficient).
170. Culbertson, supra note 166, 1127.
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first assumes trade is in balance, which implies that Country A can-
not sell to Country B more than it buys from Country B. 171 By
assuming this situation, argues the anti-free trade advocate, a coun-
try's ability to attract foreign industries with its low cost of pro-
duction is eliminated. 1
72
The comparative advantage theory assumes trade is treated as a
trade between nations rather than between individuals of different
countries. 173 No basis exists for this assumption, argue the free trade
opponents. 174 Therefore, there is no basis for the theory's conclusion
that the trade necessarily benefits both nations or that it increases
the economic efficiencies of the individual countries. 175
To this attack, believers in the comparative advantage theory
would respond first that neither country can be undersold in every
good in a free-trade equilibrium situation, unless wage rates are
unreasonably high. 76 However, if these rates increase to a level out
of proportion with labor productivity, the balance-of-payments equi-
librium will be disturbed and it is possible that all of a country's
workers would be displaced. 77 Rather than serving as an indictment
of the comparative advantage theory, however, this analysis may act
as a warning to union and government officials that dangers exist
in any effort to increase wages without an accompanying increase
in productivity.
Comparative theorists would then argue that, in explaining the
theory, David Ricardo simplified the analysis by phrasing it as one
trade between two countries rather than as a series of trades between
multiple countries, represented by individual producers. 78 Although
Ricardo limited the analysis to a world of two countries and two
products, 79 this limitation alone does not invalidate its application
171. Id. at 1129.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1130.
175. Id.
176. P. SAu.isoN, supra note 124, at 630.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 638-49 (for an extended analysis of the comparative advantage theory).
179. D. RcAI.Do, supra note 167.
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to a larger, more complex world economy. Ricardo took a broader
view of the trade between two countries by combining the trading
activities of all of the producers of each country. The sum of all
of the individual trades will produce the trade figures of the two
countries. The comparative advantages of a country are the aggre-
gate of the comparative advantages of each individual producer of
that country. Assuming the individual producer attempts to maxi-
mize his profit from every trade, 180 the sum of these trades will also
maximize the benefits to both nations. Therefore, because trade frees
up resources for their most efficient allocation, Ricardo is correct
in his assertion that trade benefits both nations involved and pushes
the production-possibility frontier' 81 beyond the point at which it
would lie without trade.
The second argument of those opposed to a reliance on the free-
market system is the danger it presents to an industry which is being
threatened by foreign competition. Economists have attacked this
"peril point" argument by arguing that those industries which no
longer have a comparative advantage should be eliminated so society
may reallocate those resources more efficiently. 182 A more effective
argument against a free trade policy is one which stresses the need
for the industry in America's national defense. However, the facts
which underlie the predicament of the U.S. coal industry do not
appear to lend support to this argument. 183 The impact of imported
coal will have to intensify before the "national defense" argument
will be taken seriously.
Therefore, due to a variety of factors it appears the free-trade
policy is preferable to a policy favoring protectionism. This sit-
uation has existed for the entire post-World War II period.184 How-
ever, the continuing debate has, unfortunately, assumed that tariffs
or free-trade policies were the only choices available in any dis-
cussion on U.S. competitiveness in the world economy. By failing
180. See, P. SAMISON, supra note 124, at 429-31, 477-78.
181. See id. at 18-20 (a production-possibility frontier illustrate a country's options along which
it can choose to substitute one good for another).
182. See supra note 124.
183. See supra note 61.
184. See supra note 154.
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to recognize the availability of other strategies, industry and gov-
ernment leaders have failed to reverse, and may even have con-
tributed to the trend of non-competitiveness witnessed in today's
domestic industries.
C. The Encouragement of Cooperative Industrial Research and
Development
In the last ten years, some economists have determined that a
strategy of reliance on the free market system alone is inadequate,
given the new economic realities U.S. industries face. 85 The basis
of the free market system, the comparative advantage theory, does
not take into account the possibility of rapid expansion of the
production-possibility frontier caused by technological advance-
ments. 186 By viewing comparative advantages as fixed, Ricardians
fail to recognize that these advantages can be created as seen in
post-World War II-Japan and in the U.S. agricultural industry. 18 7
From the realization that technological improvements can alter the
relative competitiveness of an industry and a nation, questions arise
as to the appropriate role of government in encouraging and fa-
cilitating this improvement.
The first question is whether the United States, with its firm
capitalist roots, should play any role in altering the components
of the free market system. Currently, the federal government plays
a role in the free market system and has for almost two hundred
years. 18 Although tariffs and quotas are some of the more obvious
185. See L. Tmntow, THE ZERo-SUM SoLUTIoN (1985); F. ScHERER, INDUsTRA MARKET SRUC-
TUE AND EcoNomc PERFORMANCE (1980).
186. L. Tmjrgow, supra note 185, at 108. See also Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate
Production Function, Rnv. EcoN. & STATISTICS 312 (1957); E. DENISON, Accout xno FOR UNITED
STATES EcoNomIc GRowH 1929-1969 (1974) (Solow found that 81 percent of the 1.5 percent annual
average productivity advance was due to technological change while Denison found that 22 percent
of the rise in output over the period of his study was attributable to improved work force education,
while another 48 percent was due to the advance of scientific and technological knowledge. Increases
in capital intensity accounted for only 19 and 12 percent of the increase, according to Solow and
Denison, respectively).
187. L. Tmntow, supra note 185, at 108.
188. Id. at 262 (Eli Whitney developed his system of interchangeable parts in 1788 under a
contract with the War Department. Other examples of government-assisted projects include the nation's
real aviation systems and highway systems as well as the early development of the computer).
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examples of this activity, the federal government also varies the
"normal" operations of the free market system through its rescue
of Chrysler, through its involvement in the allocation of private
credit,8 9 and through tax provisions intended to correct defects in
particular markets. 90 Even the Reagan Administration felt it nec-
essary to institute these free market-altering procedures. 19' Within
the mineral industry, specifically, Congress and the Internal Rev-
enue Service have granted preferred tax treatment through the pool
of capital doctrine 92 and through the capital gain treatment of
income received from coal and domestic iron ore leases.
193
The real issue, then, is whether to continue these activities on
an ad hoc basis or to develop a more organized and thoughtful
approach to the problem of non-competitiveness in American in-
dustries. Some may argue that this logic favors a central, planned
economy. However, this proposal favors no such idea. Rather it
presents the question of how best to assist, not control, U.S. in-
dustries in their effort to gain a new competitiveness. The answer,
states this proposal, does not lie in the present ad hoc approach
which influences the future of U.S. industries on the basis of po-
litical clout. Instead, the path to new competitiveness lies in an
189. Id. at 268 (in 1985, the Federal Government participated in lending activities in excess of
one trillion dollars).
190. See I.R.C. §§ 631(c); 1231(b)(2); 272 (1982).
191. Smith, Hogs with Wheels, FORTUNE, Apr. 10, 1989, at 38 ("Had President Reagan not
put a tariff on Japanese imports, Harley might have gone to the hog pen in the sky").
192. See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(1); 83(a); 1001(a),(b),(c); 1012 (1982). See also, J. DziENlowsrm & R.
PERON1, NATURAL REsoURcE TAxAmoN 107-17 (1988); Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551, 557-58 (1933).
The pool of capital doctrine, nonstatutory in nature, treats a mineral venture as an enterprise in
which a transaction of property and services in exchange for a share of production does not require
the current recognition of taxable gain or loss by the contributor or the recipient of the property or
services. Contrast this theory with the treatment of this type of transaction outside of the mineral
interest context. An individual or entity providing services includes the fair market value of the prop-
erty received for those services in gross income as ordinary income, and the party transferring the
property recognizes gain or loss based on the difference between the fair market value of the property
and its adjusted basis. This distinction in tax treatment is justified on the basis of the depletable
economic interest involved in the ownership of minerals.
193. See J. DzmNKowssu & R. PERONI, supra note 192, at 167-71. In 1951, Congress enacted
Internal Revenue Code Section 631(c). Under Section 631(c), a taxpayer who owns an interest in coal
or domestic iron ore for more than six months or for more than one year, if the interest was acquired
after December 31, 1987, and disposes of the right to produce the mineral while retaining an economic
interest in the mineral in place, is considered to have made a sale of property eligible for capital gain
treatment by reason of Section 1231(b)(2).
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organized effort to develop new technologies with which to push
our production-possibilities frontier to new bounds.
For any solution to result concerning the problems of the U.S.
coal and other industries, a coalition of political and industry lead-
ers must form which is able to look beyond the narrow self-in-
terests to the larger national interests . 94 In doing so, the worn and
tired argument over free trade and protectionist policies will be
left behind in order to deal with the complex problems facing the
United States today. In the process of determining the actions nec-
essary to restore the position of U.S. industries in the world econ-
omy, this coalition should investigate ways to encourage the
technological advancements which increase the productivity of our
workforce. Advancements in technology alone will not solve the
troubles of U.S. industry. However, when combined with im-
provements in education, increases in savings and investment, lower
interest rates and a newly competitive dollar, the United States can
regain its position as the world economic leader. t95
Once the federal government decides that it can and should
play a role in encouraging technological improvements, the debate
shifts to determining the program which will accomplish that goal.
The disadvantages of a system of protectionist measures are
enormous 196 and the results of such a program are questionable
given the domestic and global effects discussed earlier. 197 However,
it is clear that defects exist in the marketplace as well, 198 especially
194. In considering national interests, legislators should take into account the applicable pro-
visions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). See, General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, art. XVI; Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
195. L. TImmow, supra note 185, at 266.
196. See supra notes 126-153 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 133-149 and accompanying text.
198. J. DZY.ENKOWSKI & R. PERONI, supra note 192, at 168. (In 1951, Congress acted in response
to a defective coal-leasing market. Many landowners had entered into long-term contracts for low
fixed prices per ton. These-coal lessees enjoyed a significant cost advantage over companies seeking
to lease new properties. Even an increase in coal prices did not significantly increase the price paid
for these leases and lessors were not willing to enter into long-term contracts at the market price.
Congress patterned its response, the passage of Internal Revenue Code § 631(c), after a similar pro-
vision adopted in 1944 to affect problems in the timber industry. Section 631(c) was so successful in
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in the world coal market. 99 Recently, taxation has been viewed as
a method of regulating certain business activities.200 This proposal
suggests that Congress use the tax system to encourage business
and industry investment in research and development. 20 1 However,
before committing federal resources, 20 2 especially in the current
fiscal environment, 20 3 government and industry leaders should rec-
ognize the significant advantages and disadvantages that are as-
sociated with tax expenditures.
20 4
Critics of the use of the tax system to achieve nontax
objectives20 5 are quick to point out the many disadvantages they
believe are associated with this type of plan. They state that tax
expenditures may tend to interfere with the equity20 6 of the tax
199. See supra notes 56-59.
200. See S. BREYEaR, REouLATIoN AND ITS REFORm 164-74 (1982); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW § 13.5 (3d ed. 1986).
201. See R & D Spending Will Increase 2 Percent in 1989, Technology Group Forecasts, BNA
DAILY REP. FOR ExEcuTvEs, December 27, 1988. (Estimated total research and development spending
for 1989 is $129 billion).
202. See JOINT Comm . ON TAX'N, 1001 CONG., IsT SESS.; ESTIMATEs ON FEDERAL TAX EXPEN-
DITURES FOR FIscAL YEARS 1988-92, 2-8 (Comm. Print 1987) (Legislators recognize tax incentive pro-
grams as a use of federal resources because of the initial loss of tax revenues. In addition, it is
assumed that many of the objectives of these programs could be accomplished through direct spending
programs).
203. See, Redburn, House Passes $1.17 Trillion Budget Plan; Senate Ok Expected Today, L.A.
Times, May 18, 1989, at 16, col I (this year's budget deficit is expected to exceed $150 billion).
204. See JOINT Comm. ON TAX'N, 100m CONG., IST SEss., supra note 202 (Tax expenditures are
analogous to direct expenditure programs that have no program spending limits, and that are available
as entitlements. Under a tax expenditures program, any taxpayer who meets the criteria specified in
the Internal Revenue Code may obtain the benefits of the provision without any further action by
the Federal Government).
205. See McIntyre, Lessons for Tax Reformers from the History of the Energy Tax Incentives
in the Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1989, 22 B.C.L. Ray. 705 (1981); McIntyre, A Solution to the
Problem of Definining a Tax Expenditure, 14 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 79 (1980); Surrey & McDaniel,
The Tax Expenditure Concept: Current Developments and Emerging Issues, 20 B.C.L. REv. 225 (1979);
Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: the Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures
with Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 HARv. L. REv. 352 (1970); Surrey & Hellmuth, The Tax
Expenditure Budget - Response to Professor Bittker, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 528 (1969). For opposing views
that criticize the tax expenditure concept and defend the use of the tax system to achieve nontax
goals, see Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEx. L.
REv. 973 (1986); Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget, 22 NAT'L
TAX J. 244 (1969); Bittker, The Tax Expenditure Budget - A Reply to Professors Surrey & Hellmuth,
22 NAT'L TAX J. 538 (1969).
206. JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, supra note 202, at 3-7. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS RELATINO TO COM-
PREHENSrVE TAX REFORm, (Three ways of evaluating tax proposals include equity, efficiency and sim-
plicity. The concept of equity determines whether the tax system collects revenue in a manner which
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system, from both a horizontal 27 and vertical08 perspective. 20 9
Next, the critics argue that a program of subsidies210 makes the
tax system more complicated. 211 However, proponents212 respond
that the provision of these subsidies through another administra-
tive mechanism 213 would involve similar issues of equity, efficiency
and simplicity. 2 4 A similar argument is that subsidies impose sub-
stantial burdens on the Treasury Department and the Internal Rev-
enue Service. 2 5 They argue that the employees of these entities are
diverted from their primary goal of tax administration 21 6 and are
is as fair as possible. Efficiency concerns measure the unintended distortion in the economy caused
by taxation. Finally, simphity is determined from the viewpoint of both the taxpayer and the Internal
Revenue Service).
207. Id. (Horizontal equity is the idea that taxpayers with equal ability to pay taxes should pay
equal amounts of tax, and correspondingly, in comparing any two taxpayers with different levels of
ability to pay, the taxpayer with a greater ability to pay should pay more tax than the other).
208. Id. (Vertical equity represents the actual amount by which the tax liability of the taxpayer
with the higher ability to pay exceeds that of the other taxpayer).
209. JOINT CoM. ON TAx'N, supra note 202, at 3-7, U.S. DEP'T OF TREAs., TAx REFoRm FOR
FAmNFss, Snin'ucrry AND EcONO IC GRowTH 227-28 (1984).
210. Critics generally refer to tax incentives as subsidies. In the international trade sector, "sub-
sidies" can touch off heated disputes. Therefore, in any proposal it is important to consider the
ramifications in regard to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
211. JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, ANALYsis OF PROPOSALs RELATINO TO COMPREHENsrVE TAx REFORM,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-7 (Comm. Print 1985), Tax REF R , supra note 209. (A complicated tax
system requires a large amount of resources to understand. A large staff is required to formulate the
rules and to ensure that taxpayers calculate tax liability correctly. Taxpayers must invest large amounts
of time or money to avoid overpaying their taxes. A complex tax system also increases the chances
that similarly situated taxpayers will end up with different tax liabilities because they are not equal
in their ability to understand the rules or pay for professional tax advice).
212. Id.
213. Id. (Such as a direct expenditure program).
214. Id. (But, taxpayers' perceptions of the workings of the entire tax system may be affected
when incentives are administered through the tax mechanism).
215. Interrelationship Between U.S. Tax Policy and U.S. Energy Policy: Hearings Before a Sub-
comm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 112-17 (1979) [hereinafter
Hearings] (statement of Donald C. Lubick, assistant secretary for tax policy, U.S. Department of the
Treasury. Legislators must also recognize that a consequence of using the tax system to achieve nontax
objectives is the relinquishment of administrative control by the agency with normal responsibility In
the substantive area).
216. The structure of this proposal eliminates these administrative problems. Once the board of
experts grants a group "research partnership" status, the IRS's role is reduced to verifying the research
and development expenditures. Although the verification process does require IRS participation, the level
of activity should not be greater than that which occurs when companies conduct their own research
projects.
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required to take actions which are done more effectively, in this
case, in the Department of the Interior.2 7
The critics' third argument is that the subsidies distort the sup-
ply and demand curves218 that would result from the normal in-
teraction of the market. 219 This distortion, argue the critics, creates
an oversupply of the subsidized mineral which results in a decrease
in the price and an overconsumption of the mineral, to the det-
riment of other unsubsidized minerals and fuels. 220 A corollary to
this argument is that the subsidy distorts the allocation of resources
and encourages investments that are uneconomical at current and
expected future prices.
221
Fourth, critics argue tax subsidies give greater benefits to those
at the higher marginal tax brackets. 222 Another concern is that this
type of program will have no effect on those who have no tax
liability. 223 This concern can be avoided by structuring the incen-
tives program224 so that the tax benefits can be deferred 225 to make
development expenditures more attractive to corporations.
217. Id. (Ideally, the bureaucrat involved in administering a program is the one having substantive
knowledge of the subsidized market).
218. See P. SAmIuESON, supra note 124, at 355-83 (explains the determination of prices by the supply
of and demand for goods).
219. J. DzImtmowsia & R. PEnom, supra note 192, at 35. But see S. BREYER, supra note 200, at
164-71 (Taxes avoid the major defects of cost-of-service ratemaking by bringing about prices that equate
demand with supply and thus avoid shortages).
220. J. DzmNowsKi AND R. PERoNs, supra note 192, at 35, 167-72, 211-41 (proponents respond
that intervention or government assistance is required because defects in the market already exist. The
important goal of any proposal should be the avoidance of any unintended distortion. For examples of
governmental assistance, see Congress' actions to correct defects in the timber, coal and domestic iron
ore industries).
221. TAX REFoRm, supra note 209, at 227-28. (Critics also argue that the incentives divert workers,
capital and initiative from more productive uses elsewhere in the economy and lower the net productivity
of the nation's capital stock).
222. Hearings, supra note 112-17. See, M. Rose AND J. CHima, FEmAL INcomm TAXATION 497-
625 (1988) (Explanation of corporate taxation).
223. Hearings, supra note 215, at 112-17.
224. The proposal avoids this tax expenditure problem because it allows a participant to defer the
program's tax benefits for up to ten years to the extent it has no tax liability over that period,
225. See, W. KLI , B. BrsKER & L. STONE, FEDERA INcoun TAXATION 199-200 (1987) (The tax
code currently allows corporations to carryover net operating losses (Section 172) and capital losses (Section
1212). Under the carryover provisions a taxpayer may carryover to earlier years and carry forward to
later years). This proposal suggests that participants should be allowed to carryover and defer the tax
benefits of the program.
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Next, critics will argue that tax expenditures are a less cost-ef-
ficient method 226 of attacking the problem than is programmatic
227
spending. 228 There are several associated problems involved in such
a system including determining the level of incentives required to
encourage the necessary amount of investment in research and
development229 and evaluating the relative success or failure of the
program after a few years of operation.
2 0
Finally, critics cite the difficulty of removing the subsidy23' once
the provision is in the Code. 2 2 New legislation is required to repeal
a statute and this process could necessitate support of two-thirds of
each house of Congress if the President does not join in the push
for repeal.
In addition to recognizing the possible negative effects, it is im-
portant to realize the benefits which can result from the use of the
tax system to achieve nontax objectives. Such a proposal has the ad-
vantages of speed and dependability in conveying the incentives to the
public.3 13 This is contrasted with the lengthy bureaucratic process as-
sociated with the distribution of funds through spending programs.24
226. The structure of the program deflects this criticism. A direct spending program may be more
likely to conflict with GATT provisions. If this approach was followed, GATT signatories could impose
countervailing duties upon U.S. products. Therefore, in this situation, a direct-spending program has
additional indirect costs which make that option less cost-efficient.
227. Agencies engage in programmatic spending through the use of direct outlays or expenditures.
228. Hearings, supra note 215, at 112-17. TAx REFoRm, supra note 209, at 227-28. (A taxpayer
compliance study for taxable year 1979 showed that of $473 million taxpayer claims for energy tax credits,
$126 million in claims would have had to be disallowed had the IRS been able to fully audit all returns.
Taxpayers failed to claim only $26 million in credits that they were otherwise entitled to claim).
229. S. BaRm, supra note 200, at 164-71.
230. Joir Cowi. oN TAx'N, supra note 202, at 2-8. (Tax expenditures are difficult to measure.
One way to express their value is in terms of outlay equivalents, i.e., how large direct outlays would
have to be to place the taxpayer in the same after-tax position she would be under a tax expenditure
system). The biennial review of the research partnerships will also provide a process for evaluating its
success.
231. This proposal suggests that the program have a life of fifteen years, at which time Congress
would have the opportunity to evaluate the need for its continuance. If Congress believes that the program
is still warranted, it could pass new legislation to keep the program in existence. If Congress failed to
take action, the program would expire automatically.
232. Hearings, supra note 215, at 112-17.
233. JoiNT Comm. ON TAx'N, supra note 202, at 3-7. See, S. BaRm', supra note 200, at 164-71
(taxes involve the regulator less directly with the firms, thus mitigating the protectionist instinct present
in much classical regulation).
234. JoNr Comm. ON TAX'N, supra note 202, at 3-7.
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Another argument for the use of the tax system stresses effi-
ciency, stating that the tax system provides an administrative mech-
anism which is already in a position to reach a majority of the
American public. 25 Critics respond that the IRS is equally staffed
with bureaucrats and that the tax code is the largest source of gov-
ernmental red-tape. 6
Also, this type of program has a major advantage because it
does not mandate corporate activity but rather keeps business de-
cisions in the hands of the coal industry.237 This policy decision is
based on the assumption that an individual business is best able to
determine what is necessary to improve its competitive position. The
government's role is not to direct activity but to develop an envi-
ronment in which American businesses can compete in world mar-
kets through their own efforts.
A fourth benefit is that of encouraging investment and tech-
nological innovation in areas thought too expensive or risky for any
one company or firm.238 These initial investors create benefits for
the particular industry involved but also for the whole economy by
generating information on how best to develop new technologies.
239
A final benefit results from increased activity in technological
development. This development will increase production which is
subject to income taxation.m As a result, government revenues will
increase to cover the costs of the program. 241
In developing a plan to achieve new competitiveness, legislators
should consider a tax expenditure program. Of course, legislators
235. Id. This may be less crucial for programs funding a relatively small number of businesses rather
than millions of American taxpayers.
236. Hearings, supra note 215, at 112-17. The appropriate bureaucrat to utilize is the one having
substantive knowledge in the subject area. However, programs must be evaluated individually. The ease
of administration should be included as a factor in developing any program designed to improve the
productivity of American industry.
237. S. BaRnYE, supra note 200, at 164-71 (The proposal does provide incentives for beneficial
technological change and innovation).
238. J. Dzimaowsia & AND R. PERom, supra note 192, at 614.
239. S. BRaYE, supra note 200, at 164-71.
240. J. DzEEncows~i & R. PEtoNi, supra note 192, at 614.
241. Id. Decision-makers must also consider the costs of unemployment benefits which would be
paid if coal companies shut down mines because of noncompetitiveness. Critics respond that revenue
increases are impossible to measure and that no one can be sure that production will increase.
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must evaluate the resulting program to determine if its objectives
can be better effectuated through a direct spending program.
To spur an increase in U.S. industry's research and development
expenditures, legislators should amend the tax system2 2 to establish
a program of tax incentives for "research partnerships." A research
partnership is an arrangement of one or more companies within an
industry to conduct research aimed at improving the productivity
of those involved.4 3 The tax incentives program is designed to meet
three objectives: (1) structural flexibility; (2) productive research;
and (3) labor participation.
To receive the benefits of this program, a new partnership must
submit a research proposal to a board of experts, under the auspices
of the National Academy of Sciences. This board will evaluate the
research proposal in terms of its likelihood of success and its pro-
jected benefit to the productivity of those involved and to the in-
dustry as a whole.24 In addition, the board will view the proposal
from a general research perspective to determine if the research is
of a quality which merits support. Upon the approval of the board,
the research partnership will qualify for tax incentives administered
by the Internal Revenue Service.2 5
Structural flexibility is a vital aspect of a successful research and
development initiative. Flexibility is achieved in terms of the size of
the "partnership," the choice of entity provided, and the content
of the research proposal.
The "research partnerships" should be allowed size flexibility
because the most efficient size for a project will vary depending on
242. See supra notes 192, 193 (Analogous preferred tax treatment of mineral ventures).
243. See, National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C.A. Sections 4301-4305 (West Supp.
1989) (This legislation solves, to a large extent, the proposal's antitrust problems. Though companies are
still subject to suit for anticompetitive practices, the NCRA removed the threat of per se liability for
joint research and development projects that notify the Federal Trade Commission and the Attorney
General. The Act also limited liability to actual damages rather than the treble damages available in
traditional antitrust suits).
244. This screening process provides a vital check to excessive program expenditures. The proposal,
therefore, provides a significant advantage over the traditional tax expenditure programs, such as the those
which gave capital gain treatment to timber and coal interests. Although these programs also have recipient
requirements, there is no process involved to ensure that the program is achieving its goals. The biennial
review that is included in this proposal serves this purpose.
245. See Hearings, supra note 215.
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its scope and content. 6 The research and development process has
three stages with differing capital requirements. 247 The first stage,
invention and innovation, is relatively inexpensive and therefore
should require only modest tax incentives. At this stage, small groups
are generally the most active and efficient in the creative process.
This creativity results from a less structured environment in which
the decision to go forward with an idea is made within a tight-knit
group that knows its abilities and its limitations. 248
The second stage, full-scale development, requires much larger
financial, technical and legal resources.29 It is more likely larger
research partnerships would be involved in this stage because of their
ability to raise capital and to take advantage of economies of scale
not available to smaller partnerships. For this stage, the program
should create larger tax incentives to encourage partnerships to make
the investment in the innovations created in the first stage. A sep-
arate program to increase capital availability during this stage should
also be investigated. Without increased expenditures in this stage,
the innovations of the first stage will remain on the blackboard
rather than being put to use to increase productivity in the coal
mine.
The final stage of the research and development process can,
most likely, be left to the research participants without the need for
significant government assistance. This stage is the implementation
of the new technology into the industry's operations. The partner-
ships should not require significant incentives at this point in the
process because it will be fairly clear whether the innovation will
pay for itself over the life of its use. Tax incentives at this point
would favor only the marginal research innovations. It is question-
able whether the use of the incentives in this stage is the most ef-
ficient governmental action. Perhaps, at this point, governmental
efforts should be directed in other areas to increase world trade
options, lower interest rates and improve our educational system.
246. F. ScuimE, INwumuL MAr SmucTtRE AND EcONOMIC PERFoRMA~cE 418 (2d ed. 1980).
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Research partnerships can choose to participate at any point in
the research and development process. Also, the composition of the
groups can change as a research project moves from the stage of
innovation to the stage of development. This flexibility will give part-
nerships the ability to attract new sources of capital when the process
reaches the point of development. Finally, as partnerships become
ready to move from one stage to another they would be required to
petition the board for its approval to receive the increased tax de-
ductions which go along with the move to development.
20
A second type of flexibility which is encouraged in this proposal
is in the area of entity selection.25' This flexibility allows a corporation
to coordinate the tax benefits received with the financial or fiscal needs
of the corporation. In structuring the relationship between those in-
volved in the "research partnership," participants have three choices
of entity; sole proprietorship or nonentity co-ownership, 2 2 partnership 2 3
or C corporation. 254  Each of these options present tax255  and
250. The biennial reviews would serve as a check on a partnership's claim that activities directed
at implementation were really developmental activities.
251. An organization that possesses a separate existence for tax purposes is classified as an entity.
The IRS applies different tax provisions to the various forms of entities.
252. J. Dzmmicowsli & R. PEaomi, supra note 192, at 563-64. The sole proprietorship form of
entity exists when one person owns all the assets of a business and is solely responsible for the debts of
the firm. When co-owners act together, it must be determined whether the arrangement will be taxed as
a non-entity co-ownership or as a partnership or an association taxable as a corporation.
253. Id. at 564 Under section 761(a), the partnership form of organization is broadly defined to
include "a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organization through or by
means of which any business, financial operations, or venture carried on, and which is not a corporation
or a trust or estate. See Treas. Reg. Sections 1.761-1(a) (as amended 1972); 307.7701-3(a). See also, I
McKEE, NasoN & WNHrrmsso, FaDnzA TAXATnON OF PARmTNsmPs AND PARTmaas 3.02[w] (1977).
Case law and revenue rulings establish three requirements for an enterprise to be classified as a partnership
for federal income tax purposes: 1) the enterprise must be formed for a profit purpose; 2) the profits
produced by the enterprise must be shared jointly by two or more parties that are involved in the enterprise;
and 3) two or more of the parties sharing the profits must do so as proprietors rather than mere agents
or employees.
254. J. DzEiNcowsli & B. PEzoNi, supra note 192, at 566. An organization may be taxed as a
corporation if that group has incorporated or if the arrangement meets a six-factor test for determining
whether an unincorporated association more nearly resembles a corporation than some other form of
entity. These factors are: 1) associates; 2) an objective to carry on a business and divide the profits; 3)
continuity of life; 4) centralized management; 5) limited liability; and 6) free transferability of interests.
If the entity has more corporate than noncorporate characteristics, it will be taxed as a corporation. See
Treas. Reg. Section 301.7701-2(a)(1).
255. J. DzEiNcowssu & R. PEzoNi, supra note 192, at 570. (The most significant tax factor that
often determines the parties' choice of an organizational form for a natural resource venture is the tax
1046 [Vol. 92
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non-tax256 characteristics which corporate leaders should consider be-
fore entering into any agreement between participants. In determining
the tax consequences of each option, participants should realize that
state law labels or characterizations do not determine the classifications
of the entity for federal income tax purposes.2 7 This form of flexibility
is another attractive feature of the proposal which should make cor-
porations more interested in participating in the program.
Flexibility is also a benefit in the area of research proposals. Al-
though the partnership's proposal must include sufficient specifics to
meet the board's criteria, this initial plan is by no means fixed for
the life of the project. Instead the structure of the project should
allow the partnerships the flexibility to take innovative approaches to
problem-solving.28
Although structural flexibility should be encouraged, the pro-
gram should also concentrate on encouraging productive research.
The taxpayer has a vital interest in preventing industry research from
becoming the newest form of tax evasion. Therefore, the partnership
must appear for a biennial review before the board to justify its
continued status as a research partnership entitled to tax deductions.
The third objective of the program is labor participation. This
program is designed to encourage an increase in industrial applied
research which would result in an increased productivity and im-
proved competitiveness in our world trade dealings.259 However, la-
bor has concerns that improved technology will lead to the loss of
law's treatment of the organization's income and losses and the flexibility the parties have in allocating
the income and losses among the participants of the venture. If the taxpayer receives co-ownership treat-
ment, the income and expenses are allocated in accordance with its respective property interests and the
provisions of any existing agreement. The taxation of partnership income is governed by the provisions
of subchapter K, with all income and deductions flowing through to the individual participants (I.R.C.
Sections 701, 702). Finally, in the C Corporation, net-income is taxed at the corporate level and again
at the shareholder level when this income is distributed or when the shareholder sells shares of stock in
the corporation (I.R.C. Sections 11, 301)).
256. Id. at 562 (Nontax factors principally involve the degree of exposure for debts and liabilities
of the venture that the participants are willing to accept).
257. See, Treas. Reg. Section 301.7701-1(c).
258. F. ScHmtna, supra note 185, at 414.
259. Applied research is directed at obtaining knowledge with specific commercial implications.
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jobs. 260 New technology tends to shift the labor demand away from
unskilled labor toward skilled labor.261 However, technology alone
does not increase productivity to its utmost point. Workers can have
a great impact in determining the relative success of technology. 262
To be truly successful, the program must provide labor with an
interest in its success.
Therefore, the participation of labor should be strongly en-
couraged by the board in evaluating a research partnership. Also,
such participation should be rewarded by the partnership with a
share of the profits of any innovations which result. This arrange-
ment would give workers an economic incentive to participate. Fi-
nally, any approval of tax-preferred status should be contingent on
the creation of an employee training program to ensure that the
labor force will keep pace with the technology in use. Together,
these three points directed at the interests of labor should provide
incentives for employee participation and would therefore provide
the final ingredient necessary to take full advantage of the tech-
nological gains which will result from the encouragement of in-
creased industrial research and development.
This proposal presents advantages absent in the traditional trade
policies of protectionism and free trade. Under the proposed pro-
gram, coal companies will be encouraged to use technology to be-
come more productive, yet will retain the power to decide how best
to compete for the present and future market. By uniting the assets
of the free enterprise system with the vision to create new tech-
nologies, this plan can best realize the goal of achieving new com-
petitiveness in American industry.
V. CONCLUSION
For the last fifty years, the United States has promoted a free
trade policy on a worldwide basis. In recent years, however, an
260. L. TmRow, supra note 185, at 173 (Compares Japanese and American workers' reactions to
new technology).
261. F. ScimamE, supra note 185, at 408.
262. L. Tmmow, supra note 185, at 174.
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increasing number of United States industries have found they are
no longer competitive in the world market.
An unlikely addition to that group is the coal industry. Because
of new and cheaper supply sources in Colombia, Venezuela and
China, the U.S. coal industry's share of the world coal market has
decreased sharply. Colombia has taken advantage of its lower cost
of production and transportation and has begun to export coal into
the United States coastal regions.
This export activity has caused congressional, union and industry
leaders to call for protective action to prevent further deterioration
of the domestic market. However, protectionist measures carry sig-
nificant disadvantages both domestically and internationally. These
disadvantages include the provocation of retaliatory actions by for-
eign countries, the increase of prices for domestic customers, and
the rewarding of inefficiency. Protectionist measures, therefore, will
not lead the coal industry to a position of competitiveness.
Likewise, free trade proposals do not provide a path to new
competitiveness. These proposals, based on the comparative advan-
tage theory, view a country's or an industry's productivity assets as
fixed. Proponents fail to recognize that technological advancements
can alter a country's position relative to its competitors. Because of
this failure, free trade proponents also cannot present a solution for
the U.S. coal industry's current problems.
Until recently, no one recognized the availability of any strategy
other than protectionism or free trade. However, economists have
begun to suggest a new emphasis on technological improvement as
a means of achieving new competitiveness. These advancements can
expand the productivity of American industry and the standard of
living for all Americans.
Some argue that government should not encourage or facilitate
this improvement. However, the federal government has been play-
ing such a role for nearly two hundred years. This Note proposes
that the government move away from its current ad hoc approach
to the problem of competitiveness to an organized, long- term effort
to develop new technologies.
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This Note suggests that Congress use the tax system to encourage
business and industry investment in research and development. This
proposal is structured to avoid the disadvantages while capitalizing
on the advantages associated with tax expenditure programs.
Further, this Note argues for the creation of tax incentives for
"research partnerships." This program is designed to meet three
objectives; structural flexibility, productive research, and labor par-
ticipation. Flexibility is achieved in terms of the size of the part-
nership, the choice of entity provided, and the content of the research
proposal. The program also includes elements which will ensure that
only productive research is encouraged. Finally, labor's participation
in the research partnership is encouraged and the creation of an
employee training program is required of all research partnership
participants.
A program of research and development incentives presents unique
advantages in the move toward regaining America's competitive po-
sition in world economic markets. Together with initiatives in ed-
ucational, fiscal and monetary policies, this proposal can move the
United States in the direction of new competitiveness.
Paul Sarahan*
* At the time of this writing, the author was a student at the University of Texas College of
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